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mAbstract
We explore the redistributive effects of taxes and benefits in the 27 member states
of the European Union (EU) using EUROMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation model
for the EU. As well as describing redistributive effects in aggregate, we assess and
compare the effectiveness of eight individual types of policy in reducing income
disparities. We derive results for the 27 members of the EU using policies in effect in
2010 and present them for each country separately as well as for the EU as a whole.
JEL codes: D31, H24, I38.
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The relationship between the tax-benefit system and the distribution of income has
been the focus of longstanding scholarly work (Hicks and Swank 1984; Myles 1984). In
particular, the welfare state literature has examined the link between welfare state
characteristics and inequality and/or redistribution (Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen
1990; Castles and Mitchell 1992; Korpi and Palme 1998; Brady 2005). This strand of
research has primarily used broad macro-level indicators such as social expenditure as
a share of GDP to characterize welfare states. More recently, taking advantage of the
availability of micro-data, studies have sought to go into more detail and quantify the
redistributive effect of the various components of the tax-benefit systems, a key aspect
of the performance of welfare systems that macro data are unable to address. Along
with many national studies, several studies have taken on a comparative perspective
making use primarily of the Luxembourg Income Study (Mahler and Jesuit 2006;
Lambert et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2012) or the EU-SILC (Fuest et al. 2010; Jara and
Tumino 2013).
This paper describes the redistributive effects of the systems of direct taxes and cash
benefits of 27 member states of the European Union (EU). It is the first such analysis
making use of the 27 country version of EUROMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation
model for the EU. International comparisons of redistribution that go beyond the use
of model family analysis have tended to focus on particular parts of the tax-benefit
system (e.g.Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2001) or, as described above, make use of data
from the Luxembourg Income Study (see also Atkinson et al. 1995; OECD 2011). The
latter source is particularly useful if the focus is on long-term trends and not on the
detailed workings of up-to-date policy systems. In this paper our focus is on recent
(2010) tax-benefit systems which are broken down into detailed components.Avram et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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eral of our income components. In particular, we micro-simulate taxes, social insurance
contributions, means-tested benefits, as well as several non-means tested categories of
payment1. Although the redistributive impact of taxes and benefits may be assessed
directly, using the observed values of these income components, we believe micro-
simulating them has a series of advantages. First, use of a comprehensive micro-
simulation tool such as EUROMOD allows us to examine benefit transfers at a much
more fine-grained level than is possible using SILC micro-data alone. Moreover, since
EUROMOD simulates each individual policy, we are able to use our own classification
of benefits. This allows us to be much more accurate in our analyses2. Second, the use
of micro-simulation techniques allows us to disentangle three elements of the income
tax system: schedule, allowances and credits. To our knowledge, there is no European
comparative micro-data that can make this type of information available. Third, by
using micro-simulation we potentially improve on the measurement of some types of
transfers that are known to be relatively poorly captured in surveys (such as for example
means-tested benefits)3. Fourth, micro-simulation allows us to look at recent policies,
in this case 2010. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) and Figari et al. (2015, forthcoming)
provide comprehensive overviews of the ways microsimulation can be used to inform
policy analysis.
Examples of previous analysis of redistributive effects using microsimulation at na-
tional level include Piketty and Saez (2007) for US federal income taxes and Decoster
and Van Camp (2001) for Belgian direct and indirect taxes. EUROMOD has previously
been used for comparative analysis of redistributive effects by Immervoll et al. (2006),
covering the EU-15 and Paulus et al. (2009) covering 19 countries. In common with
most such studies our analysis assesses tax liabilities and benefit payments in terms of
their direct impact on household resources. This provides only a partial measure of
how transfers between households and governments affect incomes (Boadway and
Keen 2000) and this needs to be kept in mind when interpreting results and comparing
them across countries. On the one hand, taxes and benefits have an influence on pre
tax-benefit market incomes (and economic welfare) which is not captured by looking
at the amounts of taxes and benefits alone (Plotnick 1984; Bergh 2005). On the other
hand, in-kind transfers (to individual households or provided collectively) represent a
significant portion of the resources transferred from governments to households
(Paulus et al. 2010; OECD 2011).
We measure incomes and inequality at a particular point in time. The analysis is
therefore static and does not attempt to measure the distribution of lifetime incomes
or separate the “intra-personal” and “inter-personal” components of cross-sectional
inequality. This point is relevant because some of the tax-benefit instruments analysed
here (for ex: pensions and other contingency- or insurance-based benefits as well as
the taxes earmarked to finance them) are largely designed to redistribute across the
life-cycle rather than across individuals. However, using EUROMOD we are able to
distinguish these “life-cycle” components from those designed to redistribute from the
current rich to the current poor.
In addition, our analysis decomposes the effects of direct taxes not only into income
tax and social insurance contributions, but also breaks down the redistributive effects
of income taxes into those due to personal allowances, tax credits and the rate structure
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MOD (Verbist 2004) which focussed on the implications of each component for the pro-
gressivity of income taxes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The following section des-
cribes the data, our simulation strategy as well as our measures of inequality and
redistribution. Section 3 contains our main results. After examining the relative
size of the tax-benefit systems as well as its components in the 27 countries, we
turn to measures of redistribution. We find that public pensions together with tax
schedules are the most important redistributive elements in all countries. Similarly
to Fuest et al. (2010) we do not find that Central and European tax-benefit sys-
tems have peculiar features distinguishing them as a group from the other Member
States.
2 Methods
2.1 EUROMOD
To evaluate the redistributive effect of national tax-benefit systems we make use of
EUROMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union (Lietz and
Mantovani 2007; Sutherland and Figari 2013). EUROMOD relies on micro-data represen-
tative of the household population of each EU member state to compute tax liabilities and
benefit entitlements corresponding to each of the 27 tax-benefit systems existent in the
EU. Based on a common framework – which applies the same methods and approaches
both in the construction of its input databases and in the calculation of taxes and benefits
of each country – EUROMOD is a unique tool for international comparative research on
the effects of taxes and benefits, and their reforms, on the distribution and redistribution
of income.
EUROMOD simulates policy instruments in detail. They can be classified into four
types of policies, namely social insurance contributions, direct income taxes and their
sub-components, means-tested benefits and some types of non-means-tested benefits.
With some exceptions, pensions and other contributory benefits are not simulated due
to absence of information on contribution histories in the input dataset. Instead, the
values of these income variables are taken directly from the data.
Simulations are carried out using individual and household information from the
European Union-Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)4. The User
Database (UDB) contains the demographic, labour market and income characteristics
of a representative sample of households from each EU Member State. In some cases,
we are able to make use of supplementary information from the national version
of SILC. Information about the datasets used for each of the 27 countries included
in the analyses is available in Table 1. While in principle SILC provides a ready-
made source of comparable information across 27 EU member states, some issues
remain and the quality and comparability of our results are to some extent reliant
on the quality and comparability of SILC data (see Figari et al. (2007); Jara and
Sutherland (2013)).
In this paper, we focus on the policies in effect on the 30th of June 2010. Simulations
are carried out using data collected in the year 2008 with income information referring
to the previous year - the only exceptions are France (data collected in 2007), Malta
(data collected in 2009), and the UK (data collected in 2008/2009 and income refers
Table 1 Euromod databases
Country Input data
Belgium BE EU-SILC version 2008-2
Bulgaria BG EU-SILC version 2008–2 (+additional national variables)
Czech Republic CZ EU-SILC version 2008–2 (+additional national variables)
Denmark DK EU-SILC version 2008-1
Germany DE EU-SILC version 2008-2
Estonia EE EU-SILC version 2008-2
Ireland IE EU-SILC version 2008-2
Greece EL National SILC 2008
Spain ES National SILC 2008
France FR EU-SILC version 2007-3
Italy IT National SILC 2008
Cyprus CY EU-SILC version 2008-2
Latvia LV EU-SILC version 2008-3
Lithuania LT EU-SILC version 2008–2 (+additional national variables)
Luxembourg LU EU SILC 2008–2 (+additional national variables
Hungary HU EU-SILC version 2008-2
Malta MT EU-SILC version 2009-1
Netherlands NL EU-SILC version 2008-2
Austria AT National SILC 2008
Poland PL EU-SILC version 2008–2 (+additional national variables)
Portugal PT EU-SILC version 2008-2
Romania RO EU-SILC version 2008-2
Slovenia SL EU-SILC version 2008-2
Slovakia SK National SILC 2008
Finland FI EU-SILC version 2008-2
Sweden SE EU-SILC version 2008-2
United Kingdom UK Family Resources Survey 2008/9
Note: Detailed information about how the EUROMOD input datasets have been constructed from the original sources of
micro-data may be found in the corresponding Country Reports.
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/resources-for-euromod-users/country-reports.
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periods is dealt with by adjusting monetary variables in the input dataset. All monet-
ary variables are brought to price levels of the policy simulation year by applying up-
rating indices that reflect the average evolution of these variables between the
income reference period and the year of simulation (in our case from 2007 to 2010).
For more information and technical details on each country see the EUROMOD
Country Reports5.
2.2 Measurement
2.2.1 Measures of inequality, redistribution and progressivity
In order to measure the effects of taxes and benefits on the income distribution, we use
a set of common inequality indicators. The inequality measures used are members of
the so-called single parameter Gini (or S-Gini) family (Donaldson and Weymark 1980;
Yitzhaki 1983). By choosing the value of an “ethical” parameter v, the S-Gini (SG)
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groups to total inequality6:
SG vð Þ ¼
Z1
0
w⋅ p−L pð Þð Þdp ð1aÞ
where
w ¼ v⋅ v−1ð Þ⋅ 1−pð Þv−2; v > 1; ð1bÞ
p is the rank of individuals in a population with individual observations ordered inascending order of income whose inequality is to be measured and L(p) is the Lorenz
curve, i.e., the share of total income earned by the poorest p∙100%. For v = 2, we have
w = 2 and SG(v) is the standard Gini coefficient of inequality where departures from
equality (p - L(p)) are weighted equally for all p, while v > 2 (<2) gives more weight to
smaller (larger) p.
The equalising effect of the tax system can be measured as the difference between
S-Gini indices of the pre- and post- tax benefit income distributions, i.e. the
Reynolds-Smolensky redistribution index (Reynolds and Smolensky 1977).
RE vð Þ ¼ SGg vð Þ−SGn vð Þ ð2aÞ
The overall redistributive effect of the tax benefit system can be decomposed into a
vertical redistribution element which captures the extent to which incomes post tax-
benefit are more equally redistributed (VE) and re-ranking term (R) that captures the
extent to which the ranking of individuals according to income pre and post taxes and
benefits differs. The degree of vertical redistribution is reduced by any changes in the
ranking of individuals in the pre and after tax-benefit distribution.
RE 2ð Þ ¼ VE 2ð Þ−R 2ð Þ ð2bÞ
whereVE 2ð Þ ¼ SGg 2ð Þ−CIn 2ð Þ ¼ 2
Z1
0
p−Lg pð Þdp−
Z1
0
p−Cn pð Þdp
0
@
1
A; ð2cÞ
R 2ð Þ ¼ SGn 2ð Þ−CIn 2ð Þ ¼ 2
Z1
0
p−Ln pð Þdp−
Z1
0
p−Cn pð Þdp
0
@
1
A ð2dÞ
where Lg(p) and Cn(p) are, respectively, the Lorenz and concentration curves of
income before and after taxes and benefits.
It can be formally shown that the redistributive effect (RE) can be further decomposed
as
RE ¼ K r
1−r
−R ð3aÞ
wherer ¼
μg−μn
 
μg
ð3bÞ
K ¼ 2
Z1
0
p−Ct pð Þdp− SGg 2ð Þ ð3cÞ
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income before and after taxes and benefits μg and μn (i.e. the average ‘tax’ rate imposed
by the tax-benefit system), K is the Kakwani progressivity index (Kakwani 1977) and d
is the above-mentioned re-ranking term measuring by how much vertical redistribution
is reduced as a result of differences in the ordering of market and disposable incomes
(Plotnick 1981; Atkinson 1980). Ct(p) and Cn(p) are, respectively, the cumulative pro-
portions of total taxes and benefits and disposable incomes at point p where individuals
are ordered in terms of market incomes.
Thus, the inequality reducing properties of the fiscal system depend on the size and
inequality of the distribution of taxes and benefits, as well as any re-ranking induced by
the tax-benefit system. Since the decomposition works analogously for w ≠ 2, we can
derive measures of redistribution (RE) and progressivity (K) using different “ethical”
parameters v. In this paper, the following three values for v are used: 1.5, 2 and 3.
2.2.2 Inequality decomposition by source
In order to show the relative contribution of each source of income to overall income
inequality, the Gini coefficient of disposable income can be also decomposed into the
weighted sum of the concentration coefficients of its various sources (Lerman and
Yitzhaki 1985):
G ¼
XK
k¼1
rkCk ð4Þ
r is the share of source k in disposable income, and Ck is the concentration coeffi-cient with observations ranked in ascending order of disposable income. The concen-
tration coefficient thus expresses how unequal the income component k is distributed
across disposable income groups. The higher the concentration coefficient Ck or the
share of the most unequally distributed (or “concentrated”) components, the larger the
Gini coefficient of disposable income will be.
The effect of a marginal increase in the income source k (Mk) on the Gini coefficient
of disposable income can be measured as the difference between the contribution of k
to inequality and its share of disposable income. Hence,
Mk ¼ rkCkG −rk ð5Þ
The sign of the effect depends on the sign of Ck since r is always positive. This meansthat if the concentration coefficient from source k is negative, the marginal effect will
be negative. Otherwise, the sign will depend on the difference between the concentra-
tion coefficient of source k and the Gini coefficient. If the concentration coefficient of
source k is smaller than the Gini, the marginal effect will be negative; otherwise the ef-
fect will be positive7.
We calculate standard errors for all our estimates of inequality and redistribution
using bootstrap8. To avoid making assumptions about the shape of the distribution of
our parameters of interest, we use bias corrected confidence intervals where the lower
and upper bounds are set to incorporate 95% of the distribution.
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estimations besides sampling error. Therefore, confidence intervals should not be taken
as definitive but as an indication of the accuracy of the estimates.
2.2.3 Income
In this analysis we assume that income is equally shared within the household, so that
household disposable income can be used as an indicator of the economic well-being
of each individual within the household (‘within household’ incidence is not considered).
Household disposable income is defined as market (original) income plus private
transfers and social benefits minus taxes and social contributions, aggregated at the
household level. Non-cash benefits are not included. Household disposable incomes are
equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale.
In analysing the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems, we distinguish between
the following income components:
 original market income: this includes labour income, unearned income such as
income generates by assets (including private pensions), and inter-household
transfers
 public pension income: this includes pension income from all public statutory
pension schemes
 social insurance contributions: these include mandatory contributions paid by
employees and self-employed to cover contingencies such as unemployment,
sickness, old-age etc.
 means-tested benefits: we include here any benefit whose entitlement rules
incorporate conditions referring to individual or household incomes (and assets where
relevant and possible); fully refundable tax credits that depend on income/earnings are
included in this income component.
 contributory benefits: these include any short-term benefit (i.e. not a pension) the
awarding of which depends on previous contributions being paid.
 non-contributory, non-means tested benefits: this is a residual category that
includes cash transfers that do not meet one of the criteria above. To maintain
consistency, fully refundable tax credits that do not depend on income/earnings are
also included in this income concept.
 direct income taxes: this concept incorporates any type of taxes (excluding
contributions) paid on any type of household income.
Since direct income taxes are often the result of complex taxation systems, we disag-
gregate them into three components not all of which are necessarily present in all
countries: tax schedules, tax allowances, and tax credits. Tax allowances and tax credits
are so-called fiscal benefits and they may be an important channel through which the
tax benefit system directs resources towards households. A tax allowance is any type of
deduction from initial taxable income that would lower the effective tax base. This
includes social insurance contributions whenever they are deductible from the tax base,
as well as any tax bands where the tax rate is zero. A tax credit is any type of non-
refundable deduction from the initial tax liability (gross tax). To effect the decomposition
we take following approach. First, using EUROMOD, we estimate the gross tax (i.e. before
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tax allowances in the system (including social insurance contributions when deductible, 0
rate bands etc.) are removed, i.e. set to zero. The difference between the gross taxes calcu-
lated in the two scenarios provides a measure of the ‘value’ of tax allowances for each
household, i.e. the amount of income each household gains via lower taxes due to the
existence of tax allowances. We measure the size of tax schedules as the gross tax that
would be payable in the absence of tax allowances. The size of this variable is driven by
the tax schedule but also by other elements of the income tax system such as the extent
to which various types of incomes are subject to taxation, joint vs. individual taxation,
progressivity adjustments etc. In the remainder of the paper we will refer to the tax sched-
ule/taxable base component of the income tax system as “taxes”. Finally, tax credits are
the difference between gross and net taxes. Refundable tax credits are treated as benefits
and thus included in the benefit concepts, not in tax credits, as explained above.
It should be made clear that although the decomposition of direct income taxes
into different elements corresponding to schedules, allowances and credits goes a
long way towards unpicking the workings on the income tax systems, this decom-
position does not cover all the elements of income taxation. Features such as joint
versus individual taxation, transferability of tax allowances and credits and progres-
sivity adjustments, while included in the simulation are not directly addressed by
our decomposition.
3 Results
3.1 Relative size of tax-benefit systems
Before looking at the redistributive effects of taxes and benefits, we consider the rela-
tive size of the tax benefit system and its components. We define the size of the tax
benefit system as the sum of all tax-benefit components, i.e. all pensions, benefits,
taxes, tax allowances, tax credits, social insurance contributions, employer contribu-
tions taken as a share of household disposable income9. Using the aggregate sum of all
tax and benefit components as an indicator of system size has both advantages and dis-
advantages. On the one hand, it can be roughly interpreted as system ‘reach’. The larger
the share of taxes and benefits, the lower the share of original market incomes and thus
the higher the potential for redistribution. On the other hand, the measure incorporates
some churning. For example, including the sum of the tax (schedule), tax allowances
and tax credits elements will yield considerably larger values of system size compared
to including net taxes only, at least in some countries. Similarly, countries that offer
higher taxable benefits will appear to have a larger tax-benefit size compared countries
that offer lower non-taxable benefits, albeit the effect in disposable income may be
exactly the same.
Figure 1 shows the relative sizes of nine types of taxes and benefits. Countries are
ranked by the scale of their tax-benefit system calculated as described above. The first
thing to notice is that the size of the tax benefit system varies widely among the 27
countries. Thus, taxes and benefit instruments are three times larger in Sweden, the
country with the biggest system, compared to Bulgaria where taxes and benefits are
smallest as a percentage of disposable income. Secondly, the incorporation of taxes and
social insurance contributions (both worker and employers) in the calculation of the
tax-benefit size yields very different results from looking at benefits only. For example,
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
EU BG MT CY UK LT LU EE PT EL DE SK LV RO ES PL DK FI HU FR IE CZ IT NL SI AT BE SE
Pen MT Ben CT Ben NC Ben Tax Ee SIC Tax All Tax Cred Er SIC B-T
Figure 1 Taxes and benefits as share of disposable income, 2010. Er SIC: employer contributions;
Tax: gross tax payable in the no allowances scenarios (tax schedule); Tax Cred: tax credits; Tax All: net gain
due to tax allowances; SIC: employee and self-employed insurance contributions; NC Ben: non contributory,
non means-tested benefits; CT: contributory, non pension benefits; MT BEN: means-tested benefits; Pen: public
pensions; B-T: sum of benefits (including tax credits and net gain due to tax allowances) minus taxes (including
social insurance contributions). All income components are equivalised. Countries are ranked by size of their
tax-benefit system. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
Avram et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 9 of 292014, 3:22
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/22Italy usually categorized as a less developed welfare state (Ferrera 1996) ranks relatively
high using our measure.
Not surprisingly, among benefits, pensions are the largest component. They are
particularly important in Romania, Hungary and Italy. They are least important in the
UK, Ireland and the Netherlands where private and/or occupational pension schemes
(here included in original income) feature prominently. With the exception of a few
countries -Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium and Slovenia - contributory benefits
(other than pensions) are a relatively small income component totalling less than 5% of
equivalised disposable income. Similarly, non contributory non means-tested benefits
account for between 0 and 7 percent of disposable income. They are most important in
Hungary, Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg. In most countries, means-tested benefits
amount to less than 5% of disposable income. There are some exceptions such as the
UK and Ireland where the prevalence of means-testing has been well documented.
Other countries where means-tested benefits also play a more prominent role are
France, the Netherlands, Malta and Finland.
Contrary to the literature on regime types (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme
1998), there appears to be no systematic relationship between the various types of
non-pension benefit instruments. The country-level correlation between the size of
means-tested benefits and other non-pension benefits (as a percentage of disposable
income) is low and actually positive (0.15). Similarly, there is no systematic pattern
linking the relative size of means-tested benefits to that of contributory benefits. The
country level correlation between the sizes of these two elements of the tax benefit
Avram et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 10 of 292014, 3:22
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/22system is 0.03. However, there appears to be a mild and positive correlation between
contributory and non-contributory non means-tested benefits (the country level
correlation is 0.33) suggesting that countries with higher contributory benefits also
have higher non-contributory non-means-tested ones, possibly due to a higher
general generosity of the welfare system.
By far the largest component of the tax-benefit system, taxes are also the most
significant driver of overall system size variation. When including employee and
employer social insurance contributions, taxation ranges between 32% of disposable
income in Bulgaria to 106% in Sweden. Obviously, the high taxation levels shown in
Figure 1 are also due to the separation of tax schedules, tax allowances and tax
credits. Part of the income tax liabilities shown in the blue bars above are returned
via tax allowances and tax credits10. In fact, there is a very close relationship between
taxation levels and the use of tax allowance and tax credit instruments11. Broadly
speaking, countries may be loosely categorised as having either simple and low tax
rates systems (Cyprus, Bulgaria) or more complicated higher taxation ones
(Denmark, Austria). Essentially, higher initial gross tax liabilities are reduced via tax
allowances and tax credits, thus resulting in much lower average tax rates than what
the tax schedule alone would suggest. Theoretically, the use of tax allowances and
tax credits should provide extra flexibility to adjust the burden on particular groups.
Most countries do use tax allowance and tax credit instruments to fine tune their
fiscal regimes. However, the extent to which these types of fiscal tools affect disposable
income varies considerably. In some countries such as Sweden, Belgium, Austria,
Slovenia or Netherlands tax allowances and tax credits have a larger effect on dispos-
able income than non-pension benefits. Their use is generally much less widespread
in the New Member States. Generally, tax allowances are more important than tax
credits. The decomposition of net taxes into the tax schedule, tax allowances and tax
credits is shown in Figure 2. The tax schedule is clearly the most important deter-
minant of the final amount of net taxes12. However, tax allowances and tax credits
significantly reduce the initial tax liability. For example, the initial gross tax liability
is approximately halved in Sweden, Belgium and Ireland by the use of tax allowances
and tax credits.
Worker and employer social insurance contributions amount, on average, to about
a third of disposable income. Countries with low contributions include Cyprus,
Bulgaria, Malta, the UK and Denmark whereas the burden of contributions is highest
in France, Slovakia and Hungary. Employer contributions generally exceed those
paid by employees and self-employed although a few countries, notably Denmark,
are exceptions.
By and large, countries that tax more are also the countries that make use of more
substantial benefit transfers. The country-level correlation between net tax liabilities
(incl. employer contributions) and the size of benefit outlays is a moderate −0.41.
When looking at gross tax liabilities (incl. employer contributions) and a wider benefit
measure that includes tax allowances and tax credits, the correlation coefficient
increases notably to −0.78. However, part of this increase is explained by the negative
relationship between the size of the gross tax schedule. Figure 1 also illustrates the
aggregate net effect of the tax benefit system. This effect is negative in all countries
meaning that overall, taxes collected exceed benefit outlays.
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Figure 2 Decomposition of net taxes into tax schedule, tax allowances and tax credits. Tax: gross tax
payable in the no allowances scenarios (tax schedule); Tax Cred: tax credits; Tax All: net gain due to tax
allowances; Net tax: sum of tax schedule, tax allowances and tax credits. All income components are equivalised.
Countries are ranked by size of their tax-benefit system. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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To gain a better understanding of how the various components of the tax benefit sys-
tem affect households along the income distribution, we have repeated the analysis
above separately for each quintile of disposable income. Figure 3 presents the relative
size of different income components for the bottom quintile. As in Figure 1, countries
are ranked by the size of their tax-benefit system.
In all countries the bottom quintile gains from the tax benefit system. This is illus-
trated in Figure 3 by the positive value of the B-T indicator. Not surprisingly, house-
holds in the bottom of the distribution receive more by way of benefits and tax
concessions than they pay via direct taxes and social insurance liabilities. However, the
magnitude of the gain differs from country to country. Thus, households in the bottom
quintile gain most from the tax benefit system in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland
and the UK where their net receipts total around or just above 50% of their disposable
income. Conversely, households in the bottom quintile benefit least from the tax bene-
fit system in Lithuania, Italy, Latvia, Greece and Hungary. In these countries, the net
gain of households in the bottom quintile is, on average, less than 20% of disposable
income.
Among benefits, pensions rank high as an income source for the poorest quintile in
all 27 countries. They are particularly important in Estonia, Poland, Sweden, Belgium
and Denmark where they account for over 40% of disposable income. As expected,
means-tested cash benefits are also an important income source for the bottom quintile
especially in countries where means-testing plays a prominent role such as the UK and
Ireland. France, the Netherlands, and Romania also have relatively large means-tested
income components, accounting for approximately a third of disposable income in the
bottom quintile.
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Figure 3 Taxes and benefits as share of disposable income, 2010: bottom quintile. Er SIC: employer
contributions; Tax: gross tax payable in the no allowances scenarios (tax schedule); Tax Cred: tax credits; Tax
All: net gain due to tax allowances; SIC: employee and self-employed insurance contributions; NC Ben: non
contributory, non means-tested benefits; CT-contributory, non pension benefits; MT BEN: means-tested
benefits; Pen: public pensions; B-T sum of benefits (including tax credits and net gain due to tax allowances)
minus taxes (including social insurance contributions). All income components are equivalised. Countries
are ranked by size of their tax-benefit system. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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role for the bottom quintile. Particularly contributory benefits are unlikely to contribute
much to incomes in the lowest quintile with a few notable exceptions-Denmark,
Netherlands, and Belgium. There is more diversity in the relative size of non means-
tested non-contributory benefits. They are clearly very important to households in the
bottom quintile in Hungary but also in a few other countries such as Luxembourg,
Slovakia, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Romania, Denmark, or Austria.
Taxes and social insurance contributions are obviously much lower in the bottom
quintile compared to the population as a whole in all 27 countries. In some countries,
most notably Bulgaria and Germany but also Luxembourg, households in the bottom
quintile pay very little in the way of direct income taxes. Countries where taxation
levels on the bottom quintile are higher such as Sweden, Denmark, Belgium or Austria
also use tax allowances and tax credits to reduce the final tax liability. Tax allowances
play an especially important role in boosting the incomes of the poor in Sweden,
Austria and Greece where they account, on average, for more than a fifth of disposable
income. This is a somewhat surprising finding considering that tax allowances can be
taken advantage of only to the extent that there is enough taxable income. In Austria
and Greece, this result can probably be explained by the large share of income house-
holds in the bottom quintile derive from market sources (61% in Austria and 74% in
Greece), income which is usually subject to taxation. In Sweden on the other hand,
many of the benefits that go to the bottom quintile are taxable. High taxation of the
poor can occur also via high worker contributions. Netherlands, Romania and Hungary
Avram et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 13 of 292014, 3:22
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/22are the countries that stand out in this respect with worker contributions that amount,
on average, to more than 20% of disposable income.
Relative sizes of different types of taxes and benefits in the top quintile are shown in
Figure 4. The most important instrument affecting incomes in the top quintile is clearly
direct income taxation. However, the relative size of this instrument varies enormously
among the 27 EU countries. It ranges from 11% in Bulgaria to 78% in Sweden. As in
the case of the general population, higher taxation levels are generally offset by higher
tax allowances and tax credits13.
On the benefit side, clearly pensions are the most important transfer to the top
quintile. Means-tested benefits are virtually unavailable to households in this section
of the income distribution. Similarly, non means tested benefits-both contributory
and non-contributory, while clearly not zero, make up a very small proportion of
disposable income at the top.
The B-T line indicates the overall net gain from the tax benefit system. This indicator
is negative for households in the top quintile of the income distribution in every country
indicating that richer households contribute more than they take out from the part of the
system that we examine. Yet, the size of their contribution is country specific. Generally,
countries where the tax benefit system strongly advantages the bottom quintile are also
countries where the top loses relatively more. Examples include Finland, Sweden,
Netherlands, and Belgium. The reverse is however not true. Countries where the bottom
gains relatively less from the tax benefit system are not necessarily imposing a lower
burden on the top. For example, in Latvia the difference between benefits and taxes is-140%
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Figure 4 Taxes and benefits as share of disposable income, 2010: top quintile. Er SIC: employer
contributions; Tax: gross tax payable in the no allowances scenarios (tax schedule); Tax Cred: tax credits; Tax
All: net gain due to tax allowances; SIC: employee and self-employed insurance contributions; NC Ben: non
contributory, non means-tested benefits; CT: contributory, non pension benefits; MT BEN: means-tested
benefits; Pen: public pensions; B-T: sum of benefits (including tax credits and net gain due to tax allowances)
minus taxes (including social insurance contributions). All income components are equivalised. Countries are
ranked by size of their tax-benefit system. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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reductions in income from the tax benefit system at the top are mainly due to direct
income taxation suggesting that if richer households are to be made to contribute more
to the system this will mostly be done via higher taxation.3.3 Redistributive effect of taxes and benefits
We examine the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits by looking at a common and
simple measure of inequality, namely the Gini coefficient. We first present measures of
how income inequality changes when we exclude a given tax-benefit instrument from
the construction of household disposable income. Our measures are based on the
generalized Gini index measure (S-Gini), using three different sensitivity levels, i.e. 1.5,
2 and 3. We calculate confidence intervals for all our estimates using bootstrapping.
An overall view of inequality of disposable income levels in the 27 countries as well
as in the EU as a whole is given in Figure 5. Three S-Gini series are shown each using
a different sensitivity parameter, namely 1.5 (Gini 1), 2 (Gini2) and 3 (Gini 3). Higher
values of the sensitivity parameters indicate the corresponding S-Gini measure places
more weight on individuals at the bottom of the distribution. Countries are ranked by
the size of their tax-benefit system. Although the last seven countries do have lower
levels of inequality, there is not necessarily a straightforward relationship between the
size of the tax-benefit system and inequality of disposable income. Not surprisingly,
inequality is much higher when considering the EU as whole. This measure incorporates
not only within country inequality but also income inequality between countries.
The next 9 graphs show changes in the three S-Gini indicators if one income component
of disposable income would be excluded and inequality re-calculated based on remaining0.10
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Figure 5 S Gini values of equivalised disposable income, 2010. Note: v is the sensitivity coefficient
controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Countries are ranked by the size of their tax
benefit system. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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component. A positive number indicates that excluding the respective income component
makes the resultant income distribution more unequal, i.e. the income component
redistributes from the top to the bottom of the distribution.
First, we show in Figure 6 the redistributive effect of the entire tax-benefit system. In
effect, this involves comparing disposable incomes with market incomes. In all 27
countries, the tax benefit system generates some degree of redistribution. However, the
magnitude of the redistributive effect varies substantially across countries. For example,
in the case of v = 2, the reduction in the S-Gini index after applying tax-benefit rules
on market incomes ranges from 11 points in Cyprus to 26.5 points in Belgium and 25.3
points in Hungary. In addition to Belgium and Hungary, other countries where the
redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system is high are France, Ireland, Germany, the
Czech Republic and Luxembourg. Generally speaking, redistribution measures based
on the three S-Gini indexes generate broadly consistent country rankings. In some
cases though, reversals occur. For example, the Hungarian tax-benefit system appears
to be more redistributive than the French one when using v = 1.5 and v = 2 but not
when using v = 3. This occurs because the three indexes place different weights on the
various parts of the income distribution. In this case, the French system being particularly
redistributive when using v = 3 suggests that French taxes and benefits are particularly
effective in shifting income towards the bottom of the distribution. All three indexes show
a mild positive association with the size of the tax benefit system.
When examining the EU as a whole, the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits is
around 20 points, which is well above the country average. In fact, the achieved redis-
tributive effect can be considered relatively large given that tax-benefit systems are0.00
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Figure 6 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of all taxes and benefits, 2010. Note: v is the
sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the association
between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one income
component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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EU inequality may be found between countries14.
Figure 7 shows the changes in the three S-Gini indicators if pension income would
be excluded from disposable income. Public pensions clearly redistribute towards the
bottom in all countries. Ireland and the UK where public pensions are a less important
source of income in old-age are outliers, but even in their case the redistributive nature
of pensions is unambiguous. Interestingly, pension income is more redistributive in
countries with larger tax benefit systems. The relationship is most striking when more
emphasis is put on the poor when computing the level of inequality (S-Gini with v = 3).
Changes in the S-Gini indexes when excluding means-tested benefits are presented
in Figure 8. As expected, inequality measures increase across the board when means-
tested benefits are excluded from disposable income. The three inequality measures are
most affected in countries where means-tested benefits are relatively important such as
the UK, Ireland, France and the Netherlands. There is however no association with the
size of the tax benefit system as a whole. The lack of a relationship between the
redistributive capacity of means-tested benefits and size of the overall tax- benefit
system is partly attributable to the fact that sizeable means-tested components (and
thus a larger inequality reducing effect) may be found both in countries with smaller
tax-benefit systems (UK, Ireland) as well as in countries with more extensive systems
(France, Netherlands).
We repeat the exercise and exclude contributory benefits. Results are displayed in
Figure 9. Disregarding contributory benefits leads to small increases in the S-Gini
indexes in most countries. This suggests that contributory benefits are unlikely to
significantly alter the income distributions and thus their potential for vertical redistribution0.00
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Figure 7 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of pension income, 2010. Note: v is the
sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the association
between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one income
component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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Figure 8 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of means-tested benefits, 2010. Note: v is
the sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the
association between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one
income component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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Figure 9 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of contributory benefits, 2010. Note: v is the
sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the association
between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one income
component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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significant. Note that all four countries have relatively larger tax-benefit systems.
Likewise, non contributory non means-tested benefits have a reduced redistributive
effect. This can be clearly seen in Figure 10. The one exception is Hungary where all
three S-Gini measures go up substantially when excluding non contributory benefits
from disposable income. Denmark, Sweden and Luxembourg also have above average
redistributive effects of non-contributory benefits. There is little indication that the
vertical redistributive effect of non contributory benefits varies with the size of the tax
benefit system.
In addition to pensions, taxes are the instrument most likely to affect the distribution
of disposable income. Like pensions, they are generally progressive albeit their redis-
tributive effect is relatively muted in the New Member States as well as South European
countries. The redistributive effect of gross taxes is relatively high whenever the size of
the tax-benefit system is large. The converse is however not true. For example, taxes
are strongly redistributive in the UK (small size of the tax-benefit system) as well as
Ireland and Germany (medium size of the tax-benefit system). As expected, the redis-
tributive effect of the schedule is low in countries with flat rate taxes such as Bulgaria,
Estonia or Romania (Figure 11). While income tax is flat rate in the Slovak Republic as
well, the higher redistributive effect of the tax schedule stems from the fact that
pensions and benefits which tend to be more important to lower income groups are
not taxable. Likewise, the tax schedule has a notable redistributive effect in the Czech
Republic despite the existence of a flat-rate regime, due to the inclusion of employer
contributions into the tax base. The most extensive redistribution via the tax schedule-0.02
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Figure 10 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of non-contributory benefits, 2010. Note:
v is the sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the
association between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one
income component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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Figure 11 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of gross income tax before tax
allowances, 2010. Note: v is the sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at
the bottom. Lines show the association between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes
in inequality when excluding one income component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used
for NL.
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with the so-called ‘progressivity adjustment’15.
Neither tax allowances nor tax credits are particularly relevant for vertical redistribu-
tion (Figures 12 and 13). In fact, tax allowances are generally slightly regressive, as the
negative values of the change in the S-Gini indexes indicate. France, Belgium, and
Ireland are the countries where tax allowances do most to increase inequality. The
close interlinking of tax allowances with the tax schedule is clearly visible. Tax allow-
ances tend to be redistributive in a framework of flat-rate taxation (for example,
Romania or Estonia). On the contrary, they tend to be regressive in a context of pro-
gressive taxation.
Tax credits on the other hand are slightly progressive with the exception of
Sweden and the Czech Republic where their effect is to mildly increase inequality16.
Yet, the redistribution they effect is virtually negligible. S-Gini coefficients com-
puted when they are excluded from disposable income are very similar to baseline
coefficients.
Lastly, social insurance contributions generally do contribute to redistribution al-
beit much less than pensions or the tax schedule (Figure 14). Although the changes
in the S-Gini indexes when they are excluded are generally positive, substantively
they are relatively small. Ireland and Belgium are the countries where social insur-
ance contributions do most to vertically redistribute. There are also countries
where their effect is to increase inequality, such as Romania or the Netherlands,
possibly due to (low) caps on contributions. No relationship between the redistribu-
tive effect of social contributions and the size of the tax benefit system becomes
apparent.
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Figure 13 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of tax credits, 2010. Note: v is the sensitivity
coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the association between
the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one income component.
Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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Figure 12 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of net gain attributable to tax allowances,
2010. Note: v is the sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines
show the association between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when
excluding one income component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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Figure 14 Changes to inequality indices due to exclusion of worker contributions, 2010. Note: v is
the sensitivity coefficient controlling the weight placed on incomes at the bottom. Lines show the
association between the ranking in terms of tax-benefit size and changes in inequality when excluding one
income component. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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Next, we look at the drivers of disposable income inequality from a different perspective.
To this end, we use a standard Gini (v = 2) decomposition to show the contribution of
each type of income component to overall inequality. The contribution depends on the
size of the income component (i.e. its share of disposable income), how unequally it is dis-
tributed and its correlation with final household disposable income. The effect of a mar-
ginal increase in a given income source on the Gini coefficient of disposable income offers
an intuitive way of summarizing the contribution to overall inequality of each income
component. The percent change in the Gini index of household disposable income associ-
ated with a 1 percent marginal increase in a given tax benefit income instrument is shown
for the 27 countries and for the EU as a whole in Figure 15 below.
Clearly in all countries the largest factor contributing to inequality is market incomes.
This confirms the results of the previous section that on the whole, tax-benefit systems
redistribute significantly. Overall, the strongest effect on disposable income inequality
is exerted by pensions and taxes (i.e. tax schedules). Both tend to be redistributive. The
prominence of pensions and taxes is not surprising given that they are the largest tax-
benefit instruments affecting disposable income (see Figure 1).
In the large majority of EU countries, public pensions are the most important income
source in old-age. Since many pension systems do incorporate important redistributive
elements such as minimum pensions or caps on benefits, public pensions tend to
reduce inequality. Pensions have the strongest negative effect on the Gini coefficient in
Belgium and the Czech Republic. Their effect is much lower in countries where private
pensions are an important part of the income of the elderly such as UK or Ireland but
also in countries where their distribution is closely aligned with that of market income
such as Romania, Portugal, Austria, Hungary, or Italy. Luxembourg and France are the
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Figure 15 Redistributive* effects of marginal increases in tax benefit income components, 2010. *Percent change in the Gini coefficient of disposable income after a 1 percent increase in
the respective income components. Er SIC: employer contributions; Tax: gross tax payable in the no allowances scenarios (tax schedule); Tax Cred: tax credits; Tax All: net gain due to tax allowances;
SIC: employee and self-employed insurance contributions; NC Ben: non contributory, non means-tested benefits; CT: contributory, non pension benefits; MT BEN: means-tested benefits; Pen: public pen-
sions; Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
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of the increase would be very small.
The other main element of the tax-benefit system affecting inequality is gross taxation
before allowances (tax schedules). The effect of this is redistributive in all countries.
Nonetheless, the scale of the redistribution varies. The strongest effects are found in
Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium. All are countries using
progressive taxation regimes. On the contrary, in countries with flat rate taxation such
as Bulgaria, Estonia or Romania, an increase in the gross tax has a minimal impact on
inequality. The clear exceptions to this pattern are the Czech and the Slovak Republics,
possibly due to the way they define taxable income (see section 3.3 above).
Not all countries use tax credits in their fiscal regime but where they do, tax credits
tend to have a mild redistributive effect. Italy and the Netherlands are the only countries
where increasing income from tax credits would lower inequality substantially. Sweden is
something of an exception as its negative capital tax credit tends to be regressive. Similarly
tax credits in the Czech Republic increase inequality, possibly due to the fact that
their maximum amounts are very high meaning only earners in the top of the income
distribution are able to take advantage of the entire credit.
The effect of tax allowances on inequality as measures by the Gini coefficient is small.
The direction of their impact on inequality varies from country to country. Thus,
increasing tax allowance income by one percent would lower inequality in Estonia,
Latvia, Czech Republic, Spain and Greece by between a 14th and a 20th of a percentage
point. It would increase it in France, Belgium and Ireland by approximately a 20th of a
percentage point. Note that albeit statistically significant, these effects are small in
magnitude.-1.0000
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Figure 16 Progressivity of tax benefit income components, 2010. Note: The progressivity index is
calculated as the Kakwani measure for taxes and minus Kakwani for benefits. Er SIC: employer contributions;
Tax: gross tax payable in the no allowances scenarios (tax schedule); Tax Cred: tax credits; Tax All: net gain
due to tax allowances; SIC: employee and self-employed insurance contributions; NC Ben: non contributory,
non means-tested benefits; CT: contributory, non pension benefits; MT BEN: means-tested benefits; Pen:
public pensions. Source: EUROMOD F6.2; version G1.0+ is used for NL.
Avram et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 24 of 292014, 3:22
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/22The other type of taxation that we consider in this exercise, namely worker insurance
contributions, is much less redistributive. Their strongest equalizing impact is found in
Ireland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Belgium. However, social insurance contribu-
tions are not always redistributive. In some cases, such as for example in Romania or
the Netherlands, increasing contributions would actually increase inequality. This is
most likely due to caps on contributions.
By design, means-tested benefits are negatively correlated with disposable income. As
such, their effect is always to decrease inequality of market incomes. In most countries,
their effect is relatively muted due to their small size. However, there are a few countries
where their impact is notably larger. Ireland and UK stand out in particular but the
pattern is visible in France and to a lesser extent in Finland and the Netherlands.
Non contributory, non means-tested benefits are generally redistributive but their
contribution is small. They reduce inequality most in Luxembourg and Hungary and
have an above average impact on inequality in the UK, Slovakia, Denmark, Ireland,
Sweden and Austria. Finally, contributory benefits have the least potential to affect
inequality. Their effect at the margin is closest to zero (Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and
the Netherlands are exceptions). This is perhaps not surprising given they generally
replace market incomes in special contingencies.
3.5 How progressive are taxes and benefits?
The redistributive effect of an income component largely depends on two factors, namely its
size and its progressivity (see equation 3a). This section examines the progressivity –as mea-
sured by the Kakwani index-of the eight income components that together make up the tax
benefit system17. Figure 16 plots the calculated progressivity indexes for 27 countries of the
EU (the index is calculated as the Kakwani index in the case of taxes and minus the Kakwani
index in the case of benefits; thus, positive numbers always indicate more progressivity).
The large majority of the components of the tax-benefit system are progressive. In
fact, there are only three types of tax-benefit instruments that are regressive in some
countries. These are tax allowances, tax credits and employee social insurance contri-
butions. On the other hand, means-tested benefits and but also pensions are the instru-
ments that appear to be most progressive. The strong progressivity of means-tested
benefits is not surprising given their inverse relationship to income. In the case of
pensions, the strong progressivity is to some extent a mechanical effect. In the absence
of pensions-many pensioners would have no or little income. As such, public pensions
are negatively correlated to “non-pension” income.
The largest cross-national variation in the values of the progressivity index is found
in the case of contributory and non-contributory non-means-tested benefits. For
example, in the case of contributory benefits, progressivity ranges from 0.84 in
Netherlands and 0.78 in Denmark to 0.23 In Lithuania and 0.29 in Latvia. This suggests
that despite being generally related to previous earnings, the impact of contributory
benefits on the income distribution may vary a lot depending on their actual design as
well as the features of the wider tax-benefit system they are embedded in. Similarly,
non-contributory benefits range in progressivity from 0.63 in Hungary and 0.59 in
Sweden to 0.11 in Lithuania and 0.18 in Portugal and Bulgaria. Given that by design
they are not related to market incomes, we would expect this category of tax-benefits
instruments to be generally progressive. However, non-contributory benefits are usually
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they target, non-contributory benefits may have a larger or smaller effect on inequality.
Another somewhat surprising result is the moderate progressivity of the tax schedule.
Remember that the tax schedule captures the progressivity of the gross tax payable in
the absence of allowances. In a large number of countries, such as for example Latvia,
Lithuania or France, the progressivity of either tax allowances or tax credits or both is
positive suggesting that final net taxes are more progressive than what is suggested by
the tax schedule alone. Unsurprisingly, the most progressive schedules are the ones
with many tax brackets such as those in Germany, Luxembourg or France.
Finally, at the EU level both benefits and taxes are progressive, albeit benefits are
clearly much more progressive than taxes. The ranking of tax-benefit instruments on
the progressivity index is very similar to the general pattern found across EU countries,
i.e. pensions and means-tested benefits are the most progressive elements whereas tax
allowances and employee social insurance contributions are the least. Finally, at the EU
level-contributory benefits appear to be more progressive than non-contributory ones.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the redistributive effects of taxes and benefits in the 27 countries
that form the European Union. We rely on various Gini class measures to assess the
redistributive effect, as well as the contribution to overall inequality of eight different
tax-benefit instruments, i.e. public pensions, means-tested benefits, contributory
benefits, non-contributory non means-tested benefits, direct taxes, tax allowances,
tax credits and worker insurance contributions. In line with previous research, we
find that, overall, tax benefit systems do succeed in redistributing significant portions
of market income and in doing so they reduce inequality considerably. However, the
extent of the redistribution varies markedly across countries. Although precise country
rankings vary somewhat depending on the Gini measure used, all indicators suggest that
Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, France, Germany and the Czech Republic reduce inequality
significantly via their taxes and benefits. In contrast, tax-benefit systems reduce inequality
least in Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. According to the widest used Gini
measure (v =2.0), inequality reduction is more than twice as large in the former group of
countries compared to the latter.
The main instruments through which most of the tax-benefit systems considered in
our analysis effect their equalizing action are public pensions and direct taxes. The
strong redistributive effects of public pensions and the income tax schedule are mainly
attributable to their sizeable share in final disposable income. Both pensions and taxes
redistribute more in countries where the tax-benefit system is more extensive (as measured
by the relative size of taxes and benefits as a percentage of disposable income), reinforcing
the idea that the size of the tax-benefit income components is the strongest determinant of
their redistributive effect.
By and large, countries with higher levels of redistribution also are the countries
where direct taxation is higher. However, there is no one to one relationship between
the taxation level and the extent of redistribution effected via the tax-benefit system. In
particular, some countries with medium levels of direct taxation such as France and
Germany are still able to generate high levels of redistribution. In addition, an increased
taxation level does not necessarily equate with more extensive redistribution. For
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14th according to the reduction in the Gini coefficients determined by taxes and bene-
fits. Similarly, Netherlands, Latvia, Spain and Italy have relatively high levels of direct
taxation but only moderate or low levels of redistribution. To some extent, these results
may be explained by the structure and complexity of the tax system. On the one hand,
high gross taxation levels may be compensated by significant tax concessions resulting
in much lower net tax burdens (Sweden, Spain, and Netherlands). On the other hand,
the redistribution potential of some tax schedules is limited by low progressivity
(Sweden, Spain, and Latvia).
The level of taxation also appears to be linked to its complexity. Thus, direct tax
regimes in the EU tend to place themselves on a continuum with simple lower level
schedules at one end and more complex higher schedules at the other. In effect, more
complex elements such as tax credits or tax allowances are drawn upon to reduce final
net tax liabilities.
New Member States do not appear to form a distinct cluster either in terms of the
tax-benefit size or in terms of redistribution. The only peculiarity that is common to them
but also to Southern European countries is that their direct tax policies and tax schedules
in particular, tend to be comparatively less redistributive. One possible explanation is the
comparatively widespread use of flat-rate taxation in the Eastern European region.
The influence of non-pension contributory and that of non-contributory benefits in
disposable income inequality is largely muted. This is mostly due to their relatively
small share of disposable income which is a general pattern across the EU. On the
other hand, these are also the types of benefits where cross-national variation in pro-
gressivity is widest. One possible explanation might be that policy design in these two
categories of benefits potentially varies more than in the case of the other tax-benefit
instruments.
The disaggregation of direct taxation into schedules, tax credits and a part attribut-
able to tax allowances showed that redistribution is effected mainly via the schedules.
The redistributive effect of tax schedules is largely due to their size and to a lesser
extent to their progressivity. Neither tax allowances nor tax credits influence inequality
levels to any great extent. However, it should be kept in mind that the effect of tax
allowances and tax credits is critically linked to the design of tax schedules. In
particular, tax allowances and tax credits cannot, by design, have a significant impact in
the context of low taxation levels. Tax allowances are progressive in a context of flat
rate taxation but regressive in a progressive regime. Both tax allowances and tax credits
affect inequality much less than means-tested and even non-contributory benefits. This
reinforces the idea that the inequality-reducing capacity of fiscal benefits is limited.
To summarize, our results confirm previous findings related to the substantial
redistribution achieved via taxes and benefits, as well as to the large variation existent
across EU countries. The largest elements of the tax-benefit system (pensions and direct
taxes) are also the ones impacting strongest on redistribution despite occasionally having
low progressivity. This result is consistent with previous scholarly work on the ‘para-
dox of redistribution’ suggesting that extensive, non-targeted social programs are
able to redistribute more due to their increased resources (Korpi and Palme 1998;
Nelson 2004). Finally, direct transfers, even when not targeted (contributory and
non-contributory non-means-tested benefits) are more likely to reduce inequality
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less likely to be redistributive compared to traditional ‘social’ spending.
Endnotes
1More information about our simulations can be found in the Methods section.
2For example, EU-SILC mixes means-tested and non-means-tested benefits in several
of its income variables (family benefits, unemployment benefits etc.).
3It also has to be acknowledged that the use of micro-simulation techniques has its
own problems. For example, we are not able to fully account for benefit non take-up.
As such, our measures of redistribution should be taken as the intended rather than
the actual effect of the tax-benefit system. Benefit non-take is explicitly modelled in a
few countries where it is a widespread and important phenomenon. These include
Belgium, UK, Estonia and Greece. Tax evasion corrections are modelled in Italy and
Bulgaria.
4More information about EU-SILC can be found here: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc.
5EUROMOD Country reports covering 2010 policy systems are available online at:
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/resources-for-euromod-users/country-reports.
6See Duclos and Araar (2006). Poverty and Equity: Measurement, Policy and Estimation
with DAD. New York, Springer.A discussion of alternative interpretations of Gini
coefficients is provided by Yitzhaki (1998) "More Than a Dozen Alternative Ways of
Spelling Gini." Research on Economic Inequality 8: 13–30.
7Despite its simplicity and attractiveness, this approach is not free from problems. In
the case of an income component k that is constant for all income units, its concentration
coefficient will be zero. Therefore, the contribution of component k (calculated as rk*Ck)
would be zero, contrary to the general view that that an addition of a constant to all in-
comes decreases total inequality (Podder (1993) "The disaggregation of the Gini coeffi-
cient by factor components and its application to Australia." Review of Income and
Wealth 39(1): 51–61.). Note however that the marginal change in the Gini coefficient of
disposable income would be negative. The approach is useful for understanding how
different income components (in particular taxes and benefits) are distributed and
contribute to total income inequality.
8For more on methods to compute standard errors on inequality indices see, among
others, Yitzhaki (1991). "Calculating Jackknife Variance Estimators for Parameters of
the Gini Method." Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 9(2): 235–239, Ogwang
(2000). "A Convenient Method of Computing the Gini Index and Its Standard Error."
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 62(1): 123–129. and Efron and Tibshirani
(1993). An Introduction to the Bootstrap. Boca Raton, FL, Chapman & Hall, Giles
(2004). "Calculating a Standard Error for the Gini Coefficient: Some Further Results."
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 66(3): 425–433.
9Employer contributions, also simulated by EUROMOD, are included in this calculation
because the employee-employer share of total contributions varies widely across
countries.
10Net taxes are simply the sum of gross taxes, tax allowances and tax credits.
11The country-level correlation between the size of the tax schedule component (i.e.
gross tax payable in the no tax allowance scenario) and the sum of tax credits and gains
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/22via tax allowances is 0.9 in the sample of 27 countries. To some extent the high correlation
is partly mechanical; high tax allowances / tax credits can only be taken advantage of if
taxation (i.e. tax schedules) is high enough,
12Part of this effect is obviously mechanical; high net taxes can only come about as a
result of high tax schedules.
13The country level correlation is −0.78.
14This result holds only using PPP adjusted incomes; if Euro amounts are used directly,
a much larger share of inequality is found between rather than within countries and
thus the impact of taxes and benefits is much smaller.
15The adjustment entails the calculation of the applicable tax band including some
types of incomes, such as certain benefits, that are not themselves taxable.
16The regressive effect of tax credits in Sweden is mostly likely due to the existence of
a tax credit for interests paid on mortgages (negative capital income).
17Examining the progressivity of the tax-benefit system as a whole does not make sense
as benefits and taxes cancel each other out, generating inconsistent results.
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